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The Human Icon: Gregory of Nazianzus on Being an Imago Dei 
 
Theologians have long recognised the significance of the imago Dei in Christian 
theological anthropology; yet, how we construe the imago Dei is not determined 
straightforwardly. This essay offers a fresh reading of Gregory Nazianzen’s vision 
of the imago Dei. Hitherto, historical theologians attribute to Gregory 
an essentialist interpretation of the imago Dei, in which the imago is understood 
as the rational soul (νοῦς). I argue that Gregory depicts the imago Dei quite 
literally as a visible icon of God, by weaving together Christology, Pneumatology 
and beliefs about images and idols. If interpreted properly, Gregory’s vision 
contributes significantly to contemporary interpretations of the imago Dei, 
which aim to account for Christology, Pneumatology and the inclusion of each 
human person. 
 
Well-known by Eastern Christians as ‘the Theologian’, Saint Gregory of 
Nazianzus (circa A.D. 329) has written innovatively about God and the Christian 
life in virtually every Greek literary form. Whilst Gregory covers a vast breadth of 
subjects, he is known best for his Trinitarian doctrine and his Christology. For 
example, his soteriological dictum is often cited, which occurs in his first 
theological letter to Cledonius: ‘That which is unnassumed is unhealed, but that 
which has been united to God is also being saved’.1 Theologians have not given 
the same degree of attention to Gregory’s theological anthropology; if 
interpreted properly, I argue, his ideas contribute significantly to contemporary 
discussions regarding the imago Dei. Recognising the complexities of being a 
divine image, Gregory asks, ‘Who was I at first? And who am I now? And who 
shall I become?’2 His response is, ‘I don’t know clearly’.3 Despite living in the 
fourth-century, his reflections resonate with contemporary discussions 
concerned with how the human being is a divine image, namely: What is the 
                                                        
1 Ep. 101.5, Sources Chrétiennes 208, 50. In order to highlight the nuances in the texts, 
translations are my own, unless stated otherwise. I am grateful for the insightful 
feedback received from those attending the Research Seminars at the University of St 
Andrew’s and Durham University, at which I presented earlier versions of this essay.   
2 I apply ‘imago Dei’ and ‘divine image’ synonymously.  
3 Carm. 1.2.14, PG 37, 757, 17. 
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divine image? Does it exist within us? If so, how? If not, how else might we 
understand it? More importantly, how do we speak about the divine image in 
such a way that our conversations hold together Christology, Pneumatology and 
emphasise the inclusion of each human person?  
Traditionally, theologians have categorised the imago Dei either as 
structural, relational or functional, where ‘structural’ relates to the various 
capacities of the human person, for example, rationality or free will;4 ‘relational’ 
considers the imago Dei in light of the relationship between the three persons in 
the Trinity;5 and ‘functional’ conveys how a human person works out the task of 
being an imago Dei.6 These interpretations are not satisfactory in themselves, 
since independently they cannot encapsulate the summation of human persons 
as they image God; moreover they have been critiqued in relation to exclusivity, 
theological abstraction and biblical errancy.7 For example, it has long been 
recognised that those who cannot relate intellectually are excluded from the 
divine image if the image is interpreted as the intellect or rationality.8 The 
functional interpretation of the divine image is also subject to critiques of 
exclusivity, since it is related customarily to ruling and subduing the earth. 
Certain disabilities preclude persons from performing this role; furthermore 
feminist theologians have argued that this view draws on models of kingship 
from which women are excluded.9 Contemporary theologians offer various 
responses to how to interpret the divine image in such a way as to include each 
                                                        
4 Alister E. McGrath, Scientific Theology: Nature, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002), 
198-200. Following convention, I apply ‘structural’ and ‘substantive’ synonymously.  
5 Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, New 
York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 15.  
6 J. Richard Middleton, "‘The Liberating Image? Interpreting the Imago Dei in Context’," 
CSR 24, no. 1 (1994): 8-25, 12.  
7 For critiques of the relational, functional and substantive views respectively, see 
Harriet A. Harris, "Should We Say that Personhood Is Relational?," SJT 51, no. 2 (1998): 
214-234, 216-218; G.C. Berkouwer, Man: The Image of God, Studies in Dogmatics (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962), 71; Alistair I. McFadyen, The Call to Personhood: A Christian 
Theory of the Individual in Social Relationships (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 31. 
8 Thomas Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability and Hospitality 
(Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2008). 
9 Rosemary Radford Ruether, "The Liberation of Christology," in Feminist Theology: A 
Reader ed. Ann Loades (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1990), 138-48. 
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human person; some point to Jesus Christ, as the Image of the invisible God (Ian 
McFarland and Kathryn Tanner); some turn to phenomenology as a means of 
approaching the divine image (Susan Windley-Daoust), others argue that we 
should not attempt an interpretation and instead, should continue to search for 
the divine image (Alastair McFadyen). 10  Whilst I support the call for 
Christological approaches to the divine image, this essay aims to extend the 
search by also calling attention to Pneumatology. 
Gregory Nazianzen’s account of the divine image, I argue, contributes 
significantly to these discussions. Traditionally, commentators have attributed to 
Gregory an essentialist interpretation which locates the divine image as the soul 
(ψυχή) and/or intellect (νοῦς), a capacity which resides within the human 
being.11 By ‘essentialist’, I refer to the reduction of the divine image to one 
essential aspect of the human being; in this case it comprises the intellect, also 
known as the rational soul. Further to this, certain commentators observe that 
Gregory includes the body when speaking of the divine image, although they do 
not move on to explore how this affects the broader interpretation of the divine 
image.12  
Scholars stating that Gregory depicts the divine image as the intellect are 
                                                        
10 Ian A. McFarland, The Divine Image: Envisioning the Invisible God (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 2005); Kathryn Tanner, Christ the Key (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010); Susan Windley-Daoust, The Redeemed Image of God: Embodied Relations to 
the Unknown Divine (Maryland, U.S.A.: University Press of America, 2002); Alistair I. 
McFadyen, "Imaging God: Not so much Defining as Seeking Humanity?," in SST 
Postgraduate Conference (Manchester  8/1/2015). 
11 For example; Manfred Kertsch, Gregorio Nazianzeno: Sulla virtù, Carme giambico [I, 2, 
10] (Pisa: Edizioni Ets, 1995), 195; Heinz Althaus, Die Heilslehre des heiligen Gregor von 
Nazianz (Münster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1972), 72-74; Ben Fulford, Divine Eloquence and 
Human Transformation: Rethinking Scripture and History through Gregory of Nazianzus 
and Hans Frei (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 2013), 80-81; Hilarion Alfeyev, La 
chantre de la Luminère: Introduction à la spiritualité de saint Grégoire de Nazianze (Paris: 
Éditions du Cerf, 2006); Kirsten Koonce, "Agalma and Eikon," AJP 109, no. 1 (1988): 
108-110; Joseph Barbel, Gregor von Nazianz. Die fünf theologischen Reden (Düsseldorf: 
Patmos-Verlag, 1963), 284, et al. 
12 Anne Richard, Cosmologie et théologie chez Grégoire de Nazianze (Paris: Institut 
d'Études Augustiniennes, 2003), 265; Andreas Knecht, Gregor von Nazianz: Gegen die 
Putzsucht der Frauen. Verbesserter griechischer Text mit Übersetzung, 
motivgeschichtlichem Überblick und Kommentar (Heidelberg: Carl Winter 
Universitätsverlag, 1972); Jaroslav Pelikan, Christianity and Classical Culture: The 
Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism (New 
Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1993), 129. 
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correct to make this claim since, following Origen,13 Gregory refers to the divine 
image as either the intellect (νοῦς) or the soul (ψυχή) on numerous occasions.14 
Observe, for example, Gregory’s second oration On Peace, ‘…even though the 
greatest feature in the nature of the human person is that she is [created] 
according to the image (εἰκών) and [possesses] the capacity of intellect (νοῦς)’.15 
This is important to note, since I am not contending that the secondary literature 
has, hitherto, misinterpreted Gregory’s depiction of the divine image; rather, 
when writing on Gregory’s divine image, I suggest that scholars have not yet 
delineated the full breadth of Gregory’s vision and the implications of his 
account. This is possibly because few full-length studies exist which consider in 
depth Gregory’s approach; analyses on Gregory’s account of the divine image 
most often consist of a single chapter or paragraph in a study dedicated to 
broader aspects of Gregory’s thought.16 Exceptions to this are scholars, such as 
Philippe Molac, who provides an extensive account of key words and concepts 
linked to the divine image. He demonstrates that Gregory’s description of the 
intellect (νοῦς) is inseparably linked with flesh (σὰρξ) through the soul (ψυχή). 
Whilst Molac develops this in light of Christology, he does not move on to discuss 
the full breadth of what this may mean for the human person as a divine image.17 
I contend that within Gregory’s vast corpus of orations and poems lies a 
vision of the divine image which resembles a brightly coloured tapestry, into 
which he has woven myriad threads. Gregory does not reduce the divine image 
to a single category, such as either substance or function. Rather, he locates the 
divine image within the contexts of Christology and Pneumatology, and weaves 
                                                        
13 Origen, Homilies on Genesis and Exodus 1.13, trans. Ronald Heine, The Fathers of the 
Church V 71 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 63. 
14 Oration 14.2, PG 35, 860B-861A; 22.14, SC 270, 248-249; 28.17, SC 250, 134; 32.27, SC 
318, 142-144; Carm. 1.2.1,PG 37, 529, 97. 
15 Oration 22.13, SC 270, 248. 
16 See for example, Jostein Børtnes, "Rhetoric and Mental Images in Gregory," in Gregory 
of Nazianzus: Images and Reflections, ed. Jostein Børtnes and Tomas Hägg (Chicago: 
Museum Tusculanum, 2006), 37-57, 56. The author comments on Gregory’s approach to 
the divine image with respect to Origen’s anthropology, but does not develop the full 
breadth of Gregory’s thought on the divine image. 
17 Molac, Philippe, Douleur et transfiguration. Une lecture du cheminement spirituel de saint 
Grégoire de Nazianze (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2006). 
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in themes which pertain to experience, relationality, ontology, function, 
embodiment, ethics, sacraments, affliction, and even, spiritual warfare. If we 
were to explore each of these threads, they would fill several volumes. Therefore 
in this essay, I shall expound upon one thread, which, I argue, is christologically 
and pneumatologically robust in addition to accounting for each human person 
within the divine image. The particular aspect of Gregory’s approach, which I 
shall examine in this essay, entails Gregory’s treatment of the divine image quite 
literally, as a visible icon who bears God’s presence and who offers glory to God 
by virtue of being God’s image. In order to establish how Gregory communicates 
this, I shall survey his depiction of the divine image in dialogue with the creation 
chapters in Genesis and contemporary beliefs about statuary, by which I mean 
images and idols. I argue that beliefs about these form a key backdrop to 
understanding Gregory’s depiction of the human icon.  
Before continuing, I must pause to note that ‘icon’ does not convey fully 
Gregory’s overall vision of the human being as she is created according to the 
image of God, since he offers a multifaceted and somewhat complex account. I 
vary between translating εἰκών as ‘image’ and as ‘icon’ in order to highlight the 
nuances in the texts. On numerous occasions icon is preferable because it 
conveys a sense of visibility. The drawback with the convention of employing 
either ‘divine image’, ‘image of God’, or ‘imago Dei’ is that these phrases do not 
necessarily suggest physicality; consequently they may interpreted in abstract 
terms. Thus, by using ‘human icon’ intermittently in place of the customary 
‘divine image’ I aim to bring to the fore ideas of visibility, rather than an invisible 
component within the human person. Let us turn next to explore the backdrop to 
Gregory’s account of the visible human icon, beginning first with the creation 
narratives in Genesis. 
 
Images and Idols in Genesis and Beyond 
 
In a poem entitled Rough Boundaries in which Gregory discusses God and 
spiritual beings, such as the devil and demons, he states, ‘I am a human being, a 
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model, and an icon of God’.18 By making this claim, Gregory recalls the creation 
accounts in Genesis. The first chapter depicts the human being created as an 
image of God; whereas the second chapter offers a complementary account of the 
first human being, who is molded from the dust of the earth and enlivened 
through the breath of God: 
 
Then God said, “Let us make humankind according to our image and 
according to likeness, and let them rule the fish of the sea and the birds of 
the sky and the cattle and all the earth and all the creeping things that 
creep upon the earth. And God made humankind; according to divine 
image he made it; male and female he made them” (Gen 1.26-27).  
 
And God formed man, dust from the earth, and breathed into his face a 
breath of life, and the man became a living being (Gen 2.7).19 
 
Along with a growing number of Hebrew Bible scholars, Stephen Herring has 
attended to the way in which מלצ/εἰκών is employed throughout the Hebrew 
Bible in order to interpret Genesis 1.26-28.20 On several occasions מלצ /εἰκών 
describes a physical object, such as a statue or an idol (Wis 2.23, Num 33.52, 
Ezek 7.20, 2Kgs 11.18, Dan 3.1). This, alongside recent archaeological 
discoveries, has led Hebrew Bible scholars to re-examine ideas of the image in 
light of Ancient Near Eastern cultures which believed that an image (מלצ) 
involved a ritual process of transformation.21 Once the ritual was completed, the 
image of the god was believed to embody the god so fully that the image became 
the god itself. Egyptian texts make clear that the craftsmen were not concerned 
primarily with representing what a god looked like; instead, the image was the 
                                                        
18 Carm. 1.2.34, PG 37, 947, 20. 
19 Since Gregory used Greek translations of the Hebrew texts, the citations above are 
from the NETS translation of LXX, Robert J.V. Hiebert, 2009. 
20 Stephen L. Herring, Divine Substitution: Humanity as the Manifestation of Deity in the 
Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
2013). 
21  Zainab Bahrani, The Graven Image: Representation in Babylonia and Assyria 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 121-148.  
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place where the god manifested itself, ‘thus the presence of the god and the 
blessing that accompanied that presence were effected through the image’.22 The 
images were considered to be living images embodying the divine presence, 
rather than being merely lifeless wood or bronze statues. In effect, through ritual 
the images became the gods themselves and were considered to be ‘divine’. This 
research sheds light not only on aspects of Genesis 1.26-28, but also Genesis 2.7 
in which the author depicts the human being formed from a mixture of earth and 
breath, akin to the formation of an image of a god. Interpreted thus, the human 
being does not ‘possess’ the image within herself, but rather the human being 
herself is the image, manifesting the presence of her Creator. This relates to the 
New Testament claim that Christ is the image of the invisible God, who manifests 
God’s presence fully. Since the Ancient Near Eastern background is located in a 
vastly different culture from Gregory’s, next I shall establish an overlap in beliefs 
about images (whether statues or portraits) of gods and emperors in the Graeco-
Roman world. 
Traditionally, scholars are sceptical regarding the belief that the Graeco-
Roman gods were present in their statues. This is due to the lack of evidence for 
any ritual of animation in Ancient Greece, unlike in ancient Mesopotamia. 
Furthermore, following a negative reading of Platonic mimesis, scholars have 
argued that the educated elite understood the image as merely a copy.23 
However, in his Symposium Plato speaks about an icon as possessing great 
power; for example, Alcibiades declares that the icon of Socrates is capable of 
making him feel ashamed.24 Furthermore, studies on the ‘popular’ Graeco-
Roman view have challenged successfully this argument by demonstrating an 
acceptance of the presence of deities in images.25 For an example of this, Robin 
Fox appeals to Augustus, who banished Poseidon’s statue because of bad 
                                                        
22 Edward M. Curtis, "Image of God," in ABD, H-J, ed. David N. Freeman (New York: 
Doubleday, 1992), 389.  
23 Verity J. Platt, Facing the Gods: Epiphany and Representation in Greco-Roman Art, 
Literature and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 204. 
24 Symposium 216b. 
25 Christopher A. Faraone, Talismans and Trojan Horses: Guardians and Statues in Ancient 
Greek Myth and Ritual (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Jaś Elsner, "Iconoclasm 
as Discourse: From Antiquity to Byzantium," Art Bulletin XCIV, no. 3 (2012): 368-384, 
370. 
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weather; through this action it was believed that Augustus insulted Poseidon 
himself.26 Also, an ambiguity in the Greek language means that ‘Artemis can 
imply either the goddess herself or an image of her’.27 In his Amores, 15–16 
Pseudo-Lucian highlights why so much care had to be taken when handling 
statues, since the deity embodied within the statue could be offended through 
incorrect treatment of the statue. This implies that the line between the god and 
its statue is blurred. This notion of representation extends to ancient dream 
theory, where it makes no difference whether the dreamer sees the statue of a 
god or the god itself. 
Images of Roman emperors are also pertinent to this discussion. For 
instance, Theodosius made Maximus an emperor by erecting the latter’s image, 
which he commanded the people to worship in place of their Alexandrian gods. 
Furthermore, in Gregory’s own lifetime, the images of the emperor Theodosius 
were smashed to pieces in the tax rebellion in A.D. 387, and the emperor was 
angry precisely because his imperial image ‘embodied his own actual presence 
within the city’.28 Thus, a statue of a god embodied the divine presence of the 
god; likewise images of emperors were perceived to embody the emperor’s 
presence, functioning as a substitute for the emperor.  
Ideas such as these, i.e. pagan images and idols bear the presence of the 
god or emperor which they embody, appear to have contributed to the 
interpretation of Genesis 1.26-27 in the work of theologians preceding Gregory; 
for example, Clement of Alexandria, living in the second-century. He asserts that 
human beings are rational sculptures of the Logos of God.29 As Nasrallah argues, 
Clement ‘engages and reverses the theological statements of statuary and images 
that repeated across the cityscapes of the Greek East’.30 She goes so far as to 
                                                        
26 Robin Lane Fox, Pagans and Christians (Harmondsworth: Viking, 1986), 133. 
27 Pausanias, Description of Greece 3.16.9; Matthew Dillon and Lynda Garland, Ancient 
Greece: Social and Historical Documents from Archaic Times to the Death of Alexander 
(London: Routledge, 2010), 240.  
28 Frederick G. McLeod, The Image of God in the Antiochene Tradition (Washington, D.C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 236.  
29 Protreptikos, I.5.4, I.6.4. 
30 Laura Nasrallah, "The Earthen Human, the Breathing Statue: The Sculptor God, Greco-
Roman Statuary, and Clement of Alexandria," in Beyond Eden: The Biblical Story of 
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suggest that Clement’s ideas about the image of God cannot be understood 
outside of the second-century Alexandria which is a landscape full of ideas about 
statues and idols.31 Clement does not stand alone in his physical interpretation of 
the divine image, since Irenaeus too speaks of the image of God as visible. 
Inspired by Colossians, Irenaeus speaks of Christ as the image according to 
whose image human beings are made. He explains that the incarnate Christ 
revealed the kind of image the human being was meant to be.32 Later theologians 
such as Methodius in the fourth-century also adopted a view of the divine image 
which emphasised the importance of the visibility of the image.33 This differs 
radically from interpretations by Philo and, later, Origen who wrote, ‘The soul, 
not only for the first man, but of all men arose according to the image’.34 
Generally, it is assumed that the approach of Philo and Origen forms the basis for 
interpretations of the divine image which follow; however, the embodied 
approach was also a predominant stream of interpretation, adopted by 
theologians such as Clement, Irenaeus and Methodius.  
Thus far, I have argued that pagan statues and idols are likenesses which 
have the potential to carry some presence or power of the figure represented, 
whether it is an emperor or a god. Pagan and Christian ideas about the power of 
certain portraits are also pertinent to this discussion. For an example of this we 
may turn to our theologian. In his second poem On Virtue, Gregory recounts the 
experience of a woman engaged in prostitution, who comes across a painting of 
Polemon in the home of a dissolute youth. First, Gregory informs his reader that 
Polemon was a man who was known for ‘getting the better of the passions’. From 
this comment the reader should understand that whoever encounters the 
portrait of Polemon meets with the image of a man who is said to be virtuous. 
Gregory describes the immense power of Polemon’s gaze staring out from the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Paradise [Genesis 2-3] and its Reception History, ed. Konrad Schmid and Christopher 
Riedweg (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 110-140; 110. 
31 Nasrallah, "The Earthen Human, 110. 
32 Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, 22. 
33 Sophie Cartwright, The Theological Anthropology of Eustathius of Antioch (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015), 161. 
34 Origen, Homilies on Jeremiah; Homily on 1 Kings 28, trans. John Clark Smith, TFC 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), 23. 
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portrait; the gaze possesses such power that the woman was put to shame ‘as if 
he [Polemon] were alive (ζῶν)’.35 We assume that Gregory is drawing upon the 
belief that pagan statues or portraits possessed the potential to gaze at their 
onlookers in a way that suggests ‘magical powers’. 36  This relates, albeit 
indirectly, to the beliefs about images and idols manifesting the presence of the 
god or figure they depict, which filter through a variety of ancient cultures. 
Gregory reinterprets a contemporary belief to serve a specific purpose in his 
corpus of poems, which relates to the practice of the Christian faith.  
Let us turn now from these beliefs about images and idols and move to 
the human icon, who in a similar manner manifests the glory of God. In order to 
demonstrate the extent to which Gregory interprets the divine image quite 
literally as a visible human icon, I shall examine a breadth of themes in order to 
highlight the pervasiveness of this idea in Gregory’s thought. In light of this, we 
shall survey Gregory’s discussions of the divine image as they relate to: Christ; 
the creation of the first human being; women; and Basil at the Eucharist. 
Through these, we observe that Gregory speaks of the divine image repeatedly as 
visible. If we attend to the texts in light of the beliefs about pagan images and 
idols, we shall see how Gregory plays on the various ideas in order to highlight 
the uniqueness of the human icon against other kinds of images and idols. Most 
importantly, we shall observe that Gregory weaves together a vision of the 
human person as an icon of God, which is both theologically holistic and 
inclusive. 
 
Christ 
 
We begin with Christ as the image of God since Gregory consistently locates the 
human icon in writings concerned primarily with Christ, or the Christian 
lifestyle, for example, On the Theophany,37 On the Lights,38 On New Sunday,39 and 
                                                        
35 Carm. 1.2.10, PG 37, 793-807. 
36 For further discussion on the identity of Polemon; see Jostein Børtnes, "Rhetoric and 
Mental Images in Gregory," in Gregory of Nazianzus: Images and Reflections, ed. Jostein 
Børtnes and Tomas Hägg (Chicago: Museum Tusculanum, 2006), 37-57, 39. 
37 Oration 38, SC 358, 104-138. 
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On Sacred Pascha.40 Drawing on the New Testament witness which points to 
Christ as the image of the invisible God (Col 1.15), Gregory writes in detail about 
how Christ images God. Gregory stipulates that Christ is different from all other 
kinds of images, since Christ is ‘consubstantial’ with the Father. Christ possesses 
‘a more precise similarity than that of Seth to Adam and all those born from 
parents….  the whole impression of the whole, and the same rather than 
similar’.41 The way in which Gregory understands the importance of the likeness 
between Christ and the Father leads him to speak of Christ as the “identical 
Image” on over twenty occasions throughout his corpus.42 Since Christ and the 
human person are both described as the ‘image of God’, we are able to discern 
how Gregory applies the concept of the divine image positively to denote 
‘likeness to’ rather than ‘difference from.’ Gregory presents a description of 
εἰκών which is radically different from the one offered by Eunomius, who, in 
Apology 24 argues that likeness does not refer to likeness in substance but only 
in operation (οὐ πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν φέροι ἄν ἡ εἰκὼν τὴν ὁμοιότητα, πρὸς δὲ τὴν 
ἐνέργειαν).43 
When speaking of Christ as the image of God, Gregory incorporates 
explicitly Christ’s flesh, thus emphasising the physicality of the incarnate Christ 
as the visible image of the invisible God. For example, in his poem, Against 
Apollinarius, On the Incarnation, Gregory writes about Christ, 
 
Flesh is God’s shared dwelling place and is also God’s icon 
God’s nature mingles with its kin,  
And from there it has communion with the dull, thick flesh.44 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
38 Oration 39, SC 358, 150-197. 
39 Oration 44, PG 36, 608A-622A. 
40 Oration 45, PG 36, 623A-664C. 
41 Oration 30.20, SC 250, 268. 
42 Oration 38.13, SC 358, 132, et al. 
43 Eunomius refused to acknowledge the likeness of the Logos to the Father and 
denounced the Spirit’s deity. 
44 Carm. 1.1.10, PG 37, 469, 56-60. 
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Above, we may see that icon does not refer to the soul, but rather to Christ’s 
physicality. The inclusion of Christ’s flesh paves the way for a similar 
interpretation of the human icon, since the human icon is an icon of Christ. A key 
feature of the similarity between Christ and his human icon relates to Gregory’s 
description of them both as living images (ζῶντες). He makes this move in order 
to determine how they differ from other kinds of images and idols. Gregory’s 
description of the human icon as living relates to his interpretation of the 
creation narratives. As we shall see, the human icon is brought to life through the 
Spirit of God. 
 
Creation of the Human Icon 
 
Observe below that Gregory conflates Genesis 1 and 2 in order to describe the 
creation of the first mortal. He begins by embellishing the description found in 
Genesis 2.7. In this, God forms the first human being from the dust of the earth 
and breathes in life. Observe that for Gregory, the breath of life equates to the 
Spirit. Rather than following Genesis 2.7 precisely, Gregory weaves in Genesis 1, 
as is his custom: 
 
As [God] spoke, taking a portion of freshly made earth, 
with immortal hands God established my form and gave to it a share of 
God’s own life.  
For into it [God] infused Spirit, a fragment of the hidden Godhead. 
From clay and breath a mortal icon of the immortal One was 
established.45 
 
Above, Gregory plays on ideas about the formation of divine images and idols. 
The outcome of the clay infused with Spirit is a ‘mortal icon’ of the ‘immortal 
One’. In a poem entitled Hymn to Christ after the Silence at Pascha, Gregory refers 
to Christ as the ‘Icon of the Immortal Father, and seal of eternity’, therefore we 
assume that Gregory intends his readers to understand that the human is an icon 
                                                        
45 Carm. 1.1.8, PG 37, 452, 70-75. 
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of Christ, who is immortal.46 There are two key points we must observe from 
Gregory’s description above. The first relates to the way in which Gregory 
situates the human icon in light of Christ. For Gregory, it is impossible to speak of 
the human icon outside of the belief that Christ is the true and identical icon of 
God. This means that we cannot begin to understand what it means to be a 
human icon if we do not first look to Christ and explore how he images God.  
The second point relates to Gregory’s description of the human icon being 
brought to life by the Spirit. By making this move, Gregory locates the 
involvement of the Holy Spirit at the creation of the human icon. For Gregory, the 
Spirit gives life to the icon and therefore gives meaning and purpose to the icon. 
For, by being infused with Spirit the icon is able to manifest the presence of God 
unlike any other kind of image or idol. By depicting the Spirit present in the 
creation of the icon, Gregory avoids a common oversight in theological 
anthropology. Mark Cortez has observed that a problem occurs when 
theologians, in their discussion of the imago Dei, depict the Spirit as an 
‘eschatological addendum’.47 By this, Cortez refers to the Holy Spirit discussed 
only in relation to the renewal and transformation of the human person, but not 
viewed as present at the creation of the human person.48 Understood in this way, 
the Spirit makes an appearance halfway through the salvation story, but not until 
after the fall and consequent need for renewal and healing. The Spirit, when 
depicted in terms of transforming or renewing the human icon, is then absent 
from her initial meaning and purpose. Let us observe that Gregory does not fall 
into this trap. He positions the Spirit quite explicitly at the creation of the human 
icon, before he moves on to depict the Spirit’s transformation of the icon during 
and after. Thus, Gregory creates the space for understanding the meaning and 
purpose given to the life of the human icon by the Spirit. Her purpose is to image 
God, vis à vis, to manifest the divine life.  
Having established the significance of Christ and the Spirit to the 
                                                        
46 Carm. 1.2.38, PG 37, 1325, 12–1326, 2. 
47 Marc Cortez, "Idols, Images and a Spirit-ed Anthropology " in A Pneumatological 
Account of the Imago Dei ed. Myk Habets (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016), 267-82. 
48 For example, see Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian 
Theology of the Imago Dei (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 
225-228. 
 14 
formation of the human icon, let us turn to examine Gregory’s depiction of the 
female icon. Again, we shall see that Gregory describes consistently the female 
icon as ‘living’, which differentiates her from other kinds of images and idols.  
 
The Female Icon 
 
Gregory and his fellow Cappadocians supported the view that women image God 
in the same way as men. Other bishops in the fourth century such as Diodore of 
Tarsus refuse to allow this, drawing their arguments from Paul’s first letter to 
the Corinthians (11:7). Diodore writes, ‘Therefore the blessed Paul said rightly 
that the man alone is the image of God and his glory, but the woman is the glory 
of the man’.49 Gregory, on the other hand, is a proponent of women’s equality. He 
writes on numerous occasions about the qualities of his mother and sister and 
often in a manner which honours them as much, if not more than his father and 
brother.50 When speaking about divorce laws which are unfair to women, 
Gregory argues that he cannot support them on the basis that women are icons 
of God in the same way as men; thus women should be treated fairly, ‘There is 
one maker of man and woman, one sod of clay for both, one icon, one law, one 
death, one resurrection…’51 
The extracts we shall consider differ from Gregory’s usually positive 
stance, nevertheless they reveal much about the way in which Gregory plays on 
ideas about icons and idols. In the poems, Gregory offers advice to Christian 
women, which concerns their application of cosmetics. The first extract occurs in 
Exhortation to Virgins, in which Gregory observes that the human icon is 
different from other forms of art, since the human icon breathes. However, being 
enlivened by God’s Spirit means that the human icon has a responsibility not to 
diminish herself through the application of cosmetics: 
                                                        
49 Diodore of Tarsus, Fragments on Genesis 1.26 (PG 33:1564C–1565A). Translation; 
Nonna Verna Harrison, "The Image of God in the Antiochene Tradition," JECS 7, no. 4 
(1999): 613-14, 209. 
50 Oration 8.10, SC 405, 266. 
51 Oration 37.6, SC 318, 284. Further comment in John A. McGuckin, St. Gregory of 
Nazianzus: An Intellectual Biography (New York: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001), 
334. 
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 Let another adulterate the icon of God with coloured complexions, 
 A breathing work of art…52  
 
Consider also Gregory’s argument below in Against Women Wearing Ornaments. 
Drawing on the Genesis creation narratives, Gregory imagines God’s response to 
a woman who wears make-up as a means of enhancing her beauty. In a section of 
his poem, employing the rhetorical device of ethopoiia Gregory assumes God’s 
voice and explicates what God would say to a woman who wears make-up: 
 
Who is and whence came the creator? Be gone, one who belongs to 
another! 
I did not inscribe you, dog! But I moulded an icon of myself. 
How is it that I have an idol in place of a dear form?53  
   
Gregory’s use of “dog” (κύων) to describe a woman who wears make-up is 
somewhat contentious to the Western twenty-first century reader. Laying this 
aside, I observe two significant points about Gregory’s approach to the female 
icon. First, the defacement of the human icon occurs through the body, which 
lends itself to a reading in which the icon functions as a term for the whole 
human person. Secondly, Gregory’s play on words around the idea of icons and 
idols shows that Gregory considers the human icon to be molded by God; as such, 
she differs from a pagan idol. The addition of cosmetics to a woman’s body 
means that she is no longer able to function as God’s visible and living icon, but 
rather becomes an idol, a term which Gregory generally uses negatively to 
describe that which is dead.54 As far as Gregory is concerned, the human icon is 
alive through God’s Spirit and thus is unique, to which he alludes in his second 
poem on Ignoble Ways of Nobility:  
 
                                                        
52 Carm. 1.2.3, PG 37, 637, 57-58. 
53 Carm. 1.2.29, PG 37, 884-908, 46-48.  
54 Oration 5.28, SC 309, 348; 8.10, SC 405, 266; 39.6, SC 358, 160; 40.38, SC 358, 284; 
Carm. 1.2.1, PG 37, 532; 1.2.29, PG 37, 883; 2.1.1, PG 37, 979.  
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For indeed a painted icon is not greater than  
the breathing man (τῆς τοῦ πνέοντος ἀνδρὸς), even though it shines.55  
 
Thus far I have argued that Gregory plays on beliefs about images and idols in 
order to shed light on the uniqueness of the human person as she is created 
according to the image of God. We have observed that Gregory locates the human 
icon within the context of Christ, the identical Icon. Gregory describes both 
Christ and human icons as living and breathing in order to establish how they 
are different from other kinds of images and idols. Thus, they are able to 
manifest the presence of the divine. Let us move now to a further thread in which 
ideas about images are present; namely, Gregory’s treatment of Basil as he 
presides at the Eucharist.  
 
Veneration of the Human Icon 
 
Here we shall see that Gregory treats Basil akin to a statue in his role as priest. In 
A Funeral Oration on the Great Basil Gregory describes an Epiphany Eucharist to 
which the emperor attends unannounced. Basil is not on good terms with the 
emperor and consequently the latter’s attendance causes consternation. 
However, Basil remains calm and focused on the task at hand. Gregory likens him 
to a statue, to the extent that those around Basil revere him:  
 
With body and eyes and mind unswerving, as though nothing new had 
occurred, but rather being fixed like a statue so to speak, for God and the 
altar, while those around him stood in fear and reverence.56 
 
Like a stone or wooden image, Basil is perfectly still. In the same way that we 
would expect pagans to respond to an idol reverently, those around Basil 
respond likewise with ‘fear and reverence’. In effect, Gregory treats Basil here as 
though he were a ‘divine’ icon or idol. If we bear in mind that these images were 
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often seen as being related directly to their prototypes, it is logical that those 
around Basil would revere him, for in revering Basil as God’s icon, they revere 
God. This leads to Gregory’s concern about to whom, or to what, the human icon 
directs her worship. Gregory’s rationale indicates that worship is a principal 
vocation of the human icon. He is clear about explaining that worship must be 
directed to God, who is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Consequently, Gregory 
argues that it is not fitting for mortals to commit idolatry, precisely because they 
are icons of God: 
 
It is not right, it is not proper for a mortal to be born from God  
A beautiful and imperishable icon of the Heavenly Word… 
To give way unlawfully to empty idols 
Of things which live in the sea, the earth and that which flies in the air…57 
 
Above, Gregory locates once the mortal icon as the icon of Christ, who he refers 
to as the ‘Heavenly Word’. The mortal icon is imperishable because she is filled 
with the Spirit. In contrast, Gregory refers to idols as ‘empty’. They are not filled 
with the Spirit and cannot manifest the divine presence. Gregory’s logic follows 
that if the human is an icon of God, she should not worship idols since she herself 
is the image of the one, true God.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay has served to challenge the traditional reading which states that 
Gregory identifies the divine image only with the rational soul. Rather, I have 
argued that Gregory’s interpretation is more complex than an interpretation of 
the divine image according to one category. The particular focus here has been 
how Gregory depicts the divine image, quite literally, as a kind of visible icon. 
This was established by surveying the divine image in relation to Christ; the 
creation of the first human being; female icons; and Basil at the Eucharist. 
Through his depiction of the visible human icon, Gregory moves away from an 
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essentialist interpretation and towards one which is inclusive. By ‘inclusive’, I 
refer not only to the importance of an interpretation which signifies each human 
being according to the divine image, but also to the importance of an account 
which is christologically and pneumatologically inclusive. For example, 
theologians as wide ranging as Kathryn Tanner, John Behr, David Kelsey and Ian 
McFarland have critiqued the way in which myriad interpretations of the divine 
image do not account for the New Testament witness which points to Christ as 
the image of the invisible God.58 Gregory does not fall prey to this error, since he 
locates the human icon consistently in the context of Christ, the ‘identical Icon’. 
Added to this, Gregory’s account is pneumatologically inclusive. As we observed 
throughout this essay, when speaking of both Christ and the human icon, 
Gregory describes them frequently as ‘living’. As we observed when Gregory 
describes the creation of the ‘mortal icon’, the human icon lives precisely 
because she is enlivened by the Spirit. This explains an essential difference 
between the human icon and other kinds of images and idols, for God’s Spirit 
gives life to the human icon. As we observed, by locating the presence of the 
Spirit at the creation of the human icon, Gregory avoids a common error which 
occurs in accounts of the divine image. In these, the Holy Spirit is frequently 
depicted as transforming the divine image, but not present in the image’s 
creation. This results in a theologically errant account in which Christ is involved 
from the beginning, but the Spirit appears later on in the story. Contrastingly, for 
Gregory, the Spirit manifests its presence at the beginning of the life of the 
human icon, rendering a pneumatologically-inclusive account.  
I suggest that Gregory’s account also contributes to discussions relating to 
how we speak about the divine image inclusively with respect to each human 
person. By playing on beliefs about images and idols, Gregory offers a vision of 
the human icon in which each person’s vocation is to image God, regardless of 
gender, ability or race. Whilst Gregory was not engaged in arguments pertaining 
to ethnicity, he stipulates that women and those with physical disabilities are 
icons of God, about which, as we have already observed, theologians were 
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ambivalent during the fourth century.59 Rather than relating to gender or ability, 
Gregory’s depiction relates directly to the way in the human icon is created as an 
icon who bears God’s Spirit. Unlike the modern concern, which debates how 
human persons should be distinguished over other animals with respect to the 
divine image, Gregory distinguishes human persons as they relate to other kinds 
of images and idols. Whilst space does not allow for the exploration of the 
implications of this, I suggest that Gregory approach is compelling. It lifts the 
divine image out of the deep hole dug by debates which insist on asserting 
human uniqueness on the basis of rationality, over and against other animals. 
I close by observing that, despite his extensive treatment of the human 
icon, Gregory does not aim to provide the definitive word on this enquiry; rather 
he recognises the complexity of being an image of God. As we observed at the 
beginning of this essay, Gregory asks, ‘Who was I at first? And who am I now? 
And who shall I become? I don’t know clearly’.60 We should heed his caution as 
we continue to wrestle with how to speak about the human icon. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
59 Oration 14.1.4, PG 35, 876, 9. 
60 Carm. 1.2.14, PG 37, 757, 17. 
